The cellular bases of learning are currently under active investigation by both experimental and theoretical means. In this paper, a simple neuronal wiring diagram is proposed that can reproduce both simple and higher-order behavioral paradigms seen in invertebrate classical conditioning experiments. Learning in this model does not take place by modification of synaptic strength values. Instead, the model uses a layer of interneurons with modifiable thresholds for spike initiation, as suggested by the plasticity mechanisms thought to operate in Hermissenda [Alkon, D. L. (1983) Sci. Am. 249, 70-84]. The model therefore has an advantage in plausibility compared with more standard models using Hebb synapses or their functional equivalents, which have not yet been demonstrated in any invertebrate organism.
Recently, there has been renewed interest in attempting to understand the behavioral phenomena of classical conditioning (1) at the level of the underlying neural circuitry (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) (7) (8) . Although the circuit diagrams governing conditioning in vertebrates have not yet been determined, some circuits responsible for simpler forms of conditioning in invertebrates have been adequately mapped out (2, 3) . Unfortunately, these circuits do not immediately generalize to higher forms of learning, such as second-order conditioning and blocking. Hence, those interested in the neural basis for these behaviors must resort to the construction of theoretical models.
In the last few years, a number of computational models have been proposed to account for both simple and higherorder conditioning effects (9) (10) (11) (12) (13) (14) (15) . These models generally postulate that learning takes place by modification of the efficacy of specific individual synapses. Furthermore, the modification rules used in the models typically assume changes in synaptic efficacy that depend on a conjunction of presynaptic and postsynaptic activity-i.e., the synapses are Hebbian in the most common usage of the term. [Alternatively, one can construct circuits that are functionally equivalent to this by utilizing feedback projections from the postsynaptic neuron to the presynaptic terminals (9, 16) .] The models in refs. [9] [10] [11] [12] [13] [14] [15] will be referred to collectively as modifiable-synapse models. The general conclusion drawn from these models is that both simple and higher-order conditioning phenomena can be reproduced, provided that the learning algorithm contains the proper form of timing sensitivity and that it can generate positive, negative, or zero learning in the appropriate circumstances.
Although the modifiable-synapse models of classical conditioning may be theoretically appealing, no concrete experimental evidence proves the hypothesis that conditioning in real nervous systems actually occurs by modifying the efficacy of specific synapses. Most known synaptic plasticity mechanisms do not depend on conjunction of two separate inputs and do not exhibit the necessary timing sensitivity to account for conditioning phenomena. Several experiments have attempted to confirm the Hebb hypothesis, but these attempts have yielded either negative or inconclusive results (17) . Recent experiments have uncovered what appears to be a form of Hebbian plasticity in mammalian hippocampus (18, 19) ; however, such plasticity has not been found in invertebrates, nor has it yet been linked to conditioning behaviors. The modifiable-synapse models with the greatest degree of experimental support are based on the axo-axonic facilitator enhancement mechanism that operates in Aplysia (3) . In that animal, both the required plasticity mechanism and the required types of synaptic connectivity exist. However, even this evidence is not definitive because Aplysia has not yet behaviorally demonstrated any higher-order conditioning capabilities.
In view of this relative lack of experimental evidence, it is worthwhile asking whether modifiable synapses are necessary to achieve classical conditioning behaviors. Evidence from the circuit controlling the conditioning of responses to light in Hermissenda indicates that modifiable synapses are, in fact, not necessary. In that circuit, learning appears to take place not by modification of individual synapses but, instead, by modification of a cell-body threshold for initiation of action potentials (2, 4) . This circuit can produce the phenomena of first-order conditioning and extinction, but it has not exhibited either second-order conditioning or blocking.
In this paper, a circuit model is proposed that is capable of both simpler and higher-order forms of learning; the plasticity mechanism used is similar to that of Hermissenda. The model contains a layer of interneurons with modifiable cell-body thresholds. Interconnections within this layer enable generalization to higher-order phenomena without the necessity of feedback from the response neurons. Before the proposed model is presented, however, the neural substrates of conditioning known so far in invertebrate systems should be described in greater detail.
Circuit a of Fig. 1 illustrates the circuit governing the conditioning of gill withdrawal in Aplysia. In the naive animal the synapse from conditioned stimulus (CS) to withdrawal response (R-) is very weak; however, paired presentations of CS and unconditioned stimulus (US) enhance the CS-R-synaptic strength, resulting in first-order conditioning. Presentation of CS alone causes a decrease in synaptic strength (extinction). It should be clear, however, that this circuit will not generalize to second-order conditioning because learning depends on the explicit pairing of CS with US.
Circuit b of Fig. 1 is a theoretical construct (9, 16) proposed to account for second-order conditioning. The facilitator neuron is now the response neuron, rather than the US neuron. Thus, in a CS2 plus CS1 pairing, the CS1 signal causes R-to fire, and the resulting pairing of CS2 with Abbreviations: CS, conditioned stimulus; US, unconditioned stimulus; R-, aversive response; I, interneuron; CS-, aversively conditioned stimulus.
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R-causes CS2 to acquire an aversive character. Secondorder conditioning is thus achieved by the functional equivalent of a Hebb mechanism, which, as stated before, remains to be demonstrated in invertebrates. Fig. 2 shows how an equivalent circuit for conditioning can be made using modifiable thresholds instead of modifiable synapses. Starting with the Aplysia circuit a of Fig. 2 , the three-terminal synapse is replaced by an interneuron with a modifiable threshold, as indicated in circuit b of Fig.  2 . With an appropriate learning algorithm, the learning capabilities of circuit b of Fig. 2 can be made identical to circuit a of Fig. 2 . Qualitatively, the learning algorithm should behave as follows: When a signal from CS is received and a signal from US is received at a slightly later time, the interneuron threshold should decrease. This enables CS to fire the interneuron (I), activating R-and thus to exhibit first-order conditioning. However, if the US signal arrives before or simultaneously with the CS signal, as in the cases of simultaneous or backward conditioning, the learning algorithm should produce no change in interneuron threshold. Finally, if CS fires and US subsequently does not fire, an increase in threshold should occur, which will lead to extinction of any previous conditioning. Such a learning algorithm must be able to distinguish between inputs from CS and inputs from US, even though in terms of their effect on the output firing rate of I, the two inputs are identical. This could be accomplished, for example, by using two different excitatory neurotransmitters.
It should thus be clear that circuit b is identical to circuit a in Fig. 2 regarding single-CS phenomena. However, an advantage of circuit b emerges when one considers multiple-CS phenomena, as shown in the circuit of Fig. 3 . Interneurons can interact with each other by mutually excitatory projections, whereas three-terminal synapses cannot interact. It is proposed that connections between interneurons can account for second-order conditioning and blocking in the following way: Let us suppose that CS1 has been aversively conditioned, so that I1 has a very low threshold. When CS2 is now followed by the aversively conditioned stimulus (CS1j), 12 will receive a signal from CS2 followed by a signal from I,. If the learning algorithm makes no distinction between a signal from I, and a signal from US, the threshold of I2 will drop, resulting in second-order conditioning. Similarly, if CS2 and CS1 are presented simultaneously, as in a blocking experiment, I2 will receive (approximately) simultaneous signals from CS2 and aversively conditioned interneuron Ii-. No learning will take place in this case, because the learning algorithm excludes simultaneous conditioning.
To summarize, qualitative arguments demonstrate that the circuit of Fig. 3 can exhibit temporally specific first-order conditioning, extinction, second-order conditioning, and blocking. These phenomena can also be demonstrated quantitatively as follows. Let X0 represent the activity level of the sensory neuron US and let Xi represent the activity level of the sensory neuron CSj. Let Yj similarly represent the activity bf the interneuron Ii. (All activity levels are taken to lie between 0 and 1.) Let yj represent the threshold of Ii. We assume that all connection strengths are equal to 1 and do not change with learning. We further assume that the output of Ii is a simple step function of the total input-i.e., Yj = 0(X1 + XO + Y3.i -Y)9 [1] where the unit step function 0(X) is 1 for positive X and 0 otherwise. Then an adequate rule for modifying the threshold yj is the following learning algorithm:
[2] where e and c are small positive constants, Xj is the "stimulus trace" of Xi-i.e., a weighted average over previous times, and Mi is defined by: Mi = max(Xo, Yj, j # i).
CS US a CS US b [3] To verify that Eq. 2 behaves properly in single-CS experiments, let us consider an experiment in which Xj(t) = 0(t) and XO(t) = O(t -t')-i.e., CS1 is presented at to, and the unconditioned stimulus is presented at time t', which may be either before or after the conditioned stimulus. [4] Notice that the term in braces equals -c for t < t', 8(t -t') at exactly t = t', and 0 thereafter. From this we conclude that in a standard forward-conditioning experiment, with Proc. Natl. Acad. Sci. USA 85 (1988) t' > 0, there will be a small increase in the threshold between time 0 and time t' (because c is small and X is increasing to its maximum value). At t = t', there will be a large drop in the threshold, with no further change thereafter. (We assume that X0 remains saturated at 1 for a very long time while the CS is removed, so that by the time X0 decays and M1 becomes negative, X1 is 0, and no learning takes place. This procedure is discussed in detail in ref. 15 .) On the other hand, in a backward-conditioning experiment, t' < 0, so that by the time that the CS is presented and the stimulus trace builds up to a large value, the term in braces is already 0; thus no learning takes place. Finally, in extinction, the US never arrives-i.e., t' .oo In that case, the term in braces is always equal to -c, and the threshold will increase as long as the conditioned stimulus remains on.
Let us now consider the case when the animal has already been trained with CS1-i.e., Vy is small-and examine what happens when CS1 is paired with CS2. The activities of the sensory units are given by: X0(t) = 0, X2(t) = 0(t), and X1(t) = 0(t -t'). Because y1 is small, Y1 = X1, while Y2 = 0 as before. From Eq. 3, M1 = 0 and M2 = Y, = X1. Substituting into Eq. 2, [5] Notice that this has precisely the same form as Eq. 4. This means that the change in threshold in a second-order conditioning experiment is the same as in a forward first-order conditioning experiment. Furthermore, in a blocking experiment, t' = 0-i.e., CS1 and CS2 are presented at the same time. No learning occurs in Eq. 5, just as no learning occurs in Eq. 4 when CS and US are presented simultaneously. A few important points regarding the behavior of the proposed model should be emphasized. (i) It should be possible to generalize the circuit of Fig. 3 to an entire array of sensory neurons CS1, CS2, . .. , CSN. These, sensory neurons may continue to use single-unit representations of the conditioned stimuli or they may form nontrivial distributed representations, although in the latter case a modification of Eq. 2 would be needed. (ii) The non-Hebbian learning in this model is, in a few respects, qualitatively different from standard Hebbian models of conditioning. For example, Eq. 2 has no natural saturation mechanism; artificial clipping must be introduced to constrain y to lie between maximum and minimum values. A natural saturation mechanism is an essential ingredient for Hebb synapses, which must disregard the trivial correlations that occur when the presynaptic neuron is able to cause the postsynaptic neuron to fire. In the present situation, however, such correlations are unimportant, and thus a natural saturation mechanism is not needed. (iii) Eq. 2 has the feature that learning ceases once Mi has reached its maximum value; this obviates worry about how the learning algorithm behaves after the conditioned stimuli are removed. (iv) Do the reciprocal connections between interneurons have any nontrivial dynamical effects, or additional effects, on the learning curves beyond what has already been discussed? This is not the case in the present model because the time scale for signal propagation has been assumed to be much faster than the "stimulus trace" time scale over which learning occurs. (v) Notice that the circuit of Fig. 3 In conclusion, a model of conditioning using modifiable thresholds has been proposed that is plausible in both its anatomical wiring diagram and in its plasticity mechanism. Thus alternatives to modifiable synapses can be considered, and, indeed, such alternatives must be considered until the substrates of higher-order conditioning in invertebrates become firmly established.
The model presented here, when considered along with previous models, reinforces the importance of two basic ideas. The first is that, regardless of the locus of plasticity, the mechanism involved must depend on two inputs. There are apparently several locations where such integration of two separate sources of information can occur. Integration of presynaptic activity and postsynaptic activity can occur on the postsynaptic side of a conventional axo-dendritic synapse-as in the most straightforward interpretation of the Hebb hypothesis. Another possible site is at an axo-axonic synapse, where presynaptic activity can be integrated with facilitator activity as seen in the Aplysia circuit. A third possibility, as discussed in this paper, is that integration of separate inputs for purposes of neuronal plasticity occurs in precisely the same location as integration for purposes of spike initiation-namely, in the cell body.
The other important idea is that of equivalent circuits. The present model was obtained by construction of a circuit equivalent to the Aplysia circuit, except that the threeterminal synapse was replaced by an interneuron with a modifiable threshold. This notion of equivalent circuits appears important for theoretical modeling and may be important in real organisms as well. There may be several different ways of designing a circuit to reproduce any given set of behaviors. Choice between these alternatives would then depend on the various trade-offs that occur when comparing one design with another. For example, a Hebbian model of conditioning has the convenient property of requiring very little neuronal hardware, but, on the other hand, it also requires relatively sophisticated biochemical machinery to implement the synaptic plasticity rules. Such machinery might not be used by at least some organisms, such as simple invertebrates, and in those cases a non-Hebbian alternative, such as the model proposed here, may have evolved. At the cost of an additional layer of hardware, one can obtain conditioning with a simpler learning algorithm, which presumably can be implemented with simpler biochemical machinery. Furthermore, such a plasticity mechanism might evolve more easily because it uses an already existing location of input integration in the cell body. In contrast, for Hebbian plasticity or its functional equivalent to evolve would require the invention of a new locus of integration of disparate inputs.
